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Abstract: 
Indirect requests vary in politeness, for example, Can you tell me where Jordan Hall is? is more polite than 
Shouldn't you tell me where Jordan Hall is? By one theory, the more the literal meaning of a request implies 
personal benefits for the listener, within reason, the more polite is the request. This prediction was confirmed in 
Experiment I. Responses to indirect requests also vary in politeness. For Can you tell me where Jordan Hall is?, 
the response Yes, I can — it's up the street is more polite than It's up the street. By an extension of that theory, 
the more attentive the responder is to all of the requester's meaning, the more polite is the response. This 
prediction was confirmed in Experiments 2, 3 and 4. From this evidence, we argued that people ordinarily 
compute both the literal and the indirect meanings of indirect requests. They must if they are to recognize when 
the speaker is and isn't being polite, and if they are to respond politely, impolitely, or even neutrally. 
 
Article: 
When people make requests, they tend to make them indirectly. They generally avoid imperatives like Tell me 
the time, which are direct requests, in preference for questions like Can you tell me the time? or assertions like 
I'm trying to find out what time it is, which are indirect requests. The curious thing about indirect requests is that 
they appear to have one meaning too many. Can you tell me the time?, as a request, has the indirect meaning "I 
request you to tell me the time". Yet it also possesses the literal meaning "I ask you whether you have the ability 
to tell me the time". If the speaker is merely requesting the time, why the extraneous question about ability? 
How does it figure in the listener's understanding of that request'? It was these two questions that prompted the 
present study. 
 
These questions suggest two general kinds of processes by which an indirect request might be understood. The 
first kind, which we will call idiomatic processes, creates one and only one meaning — the indirect meaning. 
Can you tell me the time?, used as a request, would be understood directly and solely as "Please tell me the 
time". At no point would the listener create and use the literal meaning "Do you have the ability to tell me the 
time?" The second kind of process, which we will call multiple-meaning processes, creates both the literal and 
the indirect meanings, though not necessarily one after the other. By this kind of process Can you tell me the 
time? would be understood as involving both a question ("Do you have the ability?")and a request ("Please tell 
me the time"). 
 
Each kind of process is needed in certain clear cases. An idiomatic process is probably required for How do you 
do?, which is a question indirectly used as a greeting. Although the historical vestiges of the literal question 
("How are you?") are still present, the question no longer has any force; it isn't answered sensibly by Fine, 
thank you. On the other hand, a multiple-meaning process is probably required for the use of It's late, isn't it? to 
request the time. There seems to be no way of figuring out the request without knowing what the speaker meant 
literally. However, on the continuum from frozen idioms like How do you do? to novel requests like /t 's late, 
isn't it ? there are intermediate cases in which a sentence is conventionally used for an indirect purpose. For 
these, either kind of process might apply. 
 
For conventional indirect requests like Can you tell me the time?, which kind of process is used? Within 
linguistics, the earliest proposals by Sadock (1970) required an idiomatic process, but more recent ones, by 
Searle (1975) and Morgan (1978) for example, require a multiple-meaning process. Within psychology, 
Schweller (1978) and Gibbs (1979) have proposed idiomatic processes, but Clark & Lucy (1975) and Clark 
(1979) have proposed two different processes of' the multiple-meaning variety. Thus, there is an issue here to be 
resolved. 
 
The feature that makes the multiple-meaning processes distinctive is their assumption that literal meaning, plays 
a role in comprehension. But if it does, what is that role? For indirect requests, one answer has been offered by 
Lakoff (1973, 1977) and by Brown & Levinson (1978): The literal meaning is important in conveying 
politeness. As requests for the time, May I ask you what time it is? is ordinarily more polite than Won't you tell 
me what time it is? Since the two requests have the same indirect meaning, the reason must lie in their literal 
meanings. The literal meaning of the first, roughly "I request permission to ask you what time it is", presumes 
very little on the requestee and offers him the power to grant permission. The literal meaning of the second, 
roughly "I ask you if you do not intend to tell me what time it is", presumes a good deal on the requestee and 
expresses a not-so-hidden criticism. By this logic, conventional indirect requests get their politeness rather 
directly from the literal meanings. 
 
In a roundabout way, responses to indirect requests may get their politeness from the literal meanings too. 
When Ann asks Bob Can you tell me the time?, Bob might ordinarily respond with a single "move", it's six. But 
if he wanted to be especially polite, it is our intuition that he would add a first move, as in Yes, I can — it's six. 
Let us call Yes, I can the literal move, and it's six the indirect move. If we assume that Bob couldn't give the 
literal move without computing the literal meaning, then he must have taken in Ann's request by a multiple-
meaning process. But are responses with both moves actually more polite, and if so, why? 
 
In this paper, then, we will investigate two issues jointly. The first is comprehension. Does literal meaning play 
a role in the understanding of indirect requests, and if so, what? The second issue is politeness: What makes 
some indirect requests, and some responses, more polite than others? In the first half of the paper, we will take 
up the politeness of indirect requests, and in the second half, the politeness of their responses. 
 
The politeness of indirect requests 
In a request and its response, two people coordinate an exchange of goods. For convenience, let us assume the 
requestor is a woman called A, and the requestee a man called B. In her turn, A requests B to do something for 
her, and in his turn, B commits himself, or refuses to commit himself, to do what she wanted. When she 
requests information, as in all the requests we will consider, B ordinarily gives the information instead of 
merely committing himself to give it. 
 
The problem with requests is that, on the surface, they are inequitable. While A benefits from the information 
she receives, it costs B some effort to give it to her. In Goffman's (1955, 1967) terms, requests threaten B's 
"face". For Goffman, face is the positive social value people claim for themselves. It consists of two particular 
wants — the want to be unimpeded, free from imposition by others, and the want to be approved of in certain 
respects. People ordinarily act to maintain or gain face and to avoid losing face. Clearly A's requests, by 
imposing on B, are potentially threatening to B's face. Brown and Levinson (1978), following up work by 
Lakoff (1973, 1977), have incorporated this idea in a general theory of politeness whose basic tenet is this: 
people are polite to the extent that they enhance, or lessen the threat to, another's face. In our case, A will be 
polite to the extent that she can reduce or eliminate the threat to B's face caused by her request. 
 
We will look at only a few of the linguistic devices by which A could reduce or eliminate the threat to B's face - 
for example, Can you, or Couldn't you, or Will you tell me the time? These devices differ in how much they 
benefit or cost B. Ordinarily, if a device benefits B, it simultaneously costs A, although the benefit to B may not 
equal the cost to A. For simplicity, we will assume that the benefit or cost to B actually does equal the cost or 
benefit to A. So A will be polite to the extent that the linguistic device she selects benefits B or lowers the cost 
to B (at least within limits). 
 
The linguistic devices we have selected are ones in which A asks B a literal question answerable by yes or no, 
and by virtue of that question she requests from him a relatively slight piece of information. Example: Will you 
tell me who is coming to dinner tonight? From the literature on indirect requests (e.g., Gordon & Lakoff, 1971; 
Green, 1975; Heringer, 1972; Sadock, 1972, 1974; Searle, 1975), we selected the 18 types listed in Table 1. 
These requests vary from polite to impolite; some of them take a literal yes answer for compliance, and others 
take a no. We will use the first few words of each request as its abbreviation, like May I ask you? for May I ask 
you where Jordan Hall is? 
 
Since all 18 requests have the same indirect meaning, their differences lie in the literal meanings. Indeed, these 
requests can be ordered, on a priori intuitive grounds, for how much their literal meanings, if taken seriously, 
would benefit B or reduce the costs to B. Note that all of them have one cost in common. They impose on B by 
asking a question he must answer with yes or no. Otherwise, the requests can be sorted into six broad categories 
(see Gordon & Lakoff, 1971; Searle, 1975), as shown in Table 1. These categories can be ordered 
approximately for their benefit to B. 
 
1. Permission. With the literal meaning of May I ask you where Jordan Hall is? , A is offering B the 
authority to grant her permission to make her request. This is obviously a great benefit to B. He now has a 
higher status, or authority, than he had the moment before, and the status entitles him to give permission to A 
even to make a rather trivial request. Such a benefit makes this and the other two requests in this category 
particularly polite. 
 
2. Imposition. With the literal meaning of Would you mind telling me where Jordan Hall is? , A is no longer 
offering B the full authority to permit her to ask him for the wanted information. Still, she is offering him the 
authority to say that her request imposes too much. This benefits B. A is thereby admitting that she is imposing 
on him, and the admission benefits B too. So Would you mind? should be relatively polite too, although not as 
polite as May I ask? and its kind. The authority to grant permission, on the face of it, benefits B more than the 
mere chance to say that the task is too imposing. 
 
3. Ability. When A says Can you tell me where Jordan Hall is? , she is literally asking B to say whether or 
not he has the ability to tell her where Jordan Hall is. By giving him the opportunity to deny this ability, the 
question both benefits and costs B a little bit. It benefits him by allowing him to avoid the embarrassment of 
being asked a request he couldn't comply with. But it costs him a little by suggesting that he may not be 
competent to comply. Compared to May I ask? and Would you mind? with their great benefits to B, Can you tell 
me? should be less polite. In so far as the other three ability requests reflect the same rationale, they should be 
similar in politeness. We will take up this qualification later. 
 
4. Memory. The literal meaning of Have I already asked you where Jordan Hall is? makes a subtle demand 
on B. It asks him whether or not he can remember whether A asked him earlier for the location of Jordan Hall. 
Most of the time he won't find this literal demand easy to fulfill, and anyway, why should he be expected to 
keep track of what he has told her when she is in as good a position to remember as he is? So this question, if 
anything, costs B something, which works against politeness. The same goes for the other three requests in this 
category, especially Do I know? These requests should be less polite, generally, than those of permission, 
imposition, or ability. 
 
5. Commitment. With the literal meaning of Will you tell me where Jordan Hall is?, A is asking B whether 
or not he will commit himself to tell her the wanted information. Commitments, of course, are quite the 
opposite of per-missions. In commitments, B obligates himself to A to carry out an action. This gives her the 
authority later to demand the fulfillment of his obligation, and that puts him in a position inferior to her. This 
should cost B a great deal — probably as much as or more than the memory requests. If so, Will you tell me? 
and its kind should be less polite even than the memory requests. 
 
6. Obligation. The last request, Shouldn't you tell me where Jordan Hall is?, should be the least polite of all. 
By using should, A is literally asking B whether or not he is under some obligation to tell her the wanted 
information. By using shouldn't, she further implies that B has failed in his obligation. Her request, then, costs 
B in two ways. It implies that he is obligated to tell her something; he has no choice in the matter. The 
obligation here is more severe than in the commitment requests. And it scolds him for already having failed in 
his duties. With such onerous costs to B, this request should be relatively impolite. 
 
As this discussion shows, the ways in which the literal meaning can be used to benefit and cost B involve many 
factors. The ordering of these six categories of requests is our best judgment of how these factors combine for a 
net amount of politeness. Yet three factors that cut across these six categories and lead to subsidiary predictions 
are conditionality, negativity, and strength. 
 
The difference between May I ask you? and Might I ask you? is one of conditionality. The subjunctive might 
ordinarily indicates that what is being said is conditional on something. For Might I ask?, Brown and Levinson 
(1978), among others, speculate that the implicit condition is if you please. If so, might should benefit B and 
increase the politeness of the request, since it makes explicit that B can do as he pleases. The same contrast is 
found between Can you tell me? and Could you tell me?, and between Will you tell me? and Would you tell me? 
In each case, the conditional request should be the more polite of the two. 
 
The second factor is negativity, the difference between can and can't and between will and won't. The literal 
question Can you tell me? doesn't express any opinion pro or con about what the answer is likely to be. Can't 
you tell me?, however, does (Bolinger, 1975, pp. 528-529). In some contexts, it indicates that A expects a yes 
answer, supposing that B really can tell her the information. This is the so-called conducive reading. In other 
contexts, it indicates that A supposes that B cannot tell her the information and what she is questioning is 
whether or not her supposition is correct. This is the so-called plain reading. Either interpretation should be 
costly to B. The first presumes on B since it indicates that A already knows what his answer will be. And the 
second expresses a negative opinion about B — he doesn't have the ability to tell her the wanted information. 
Similar arguments go through for Will you tell me? and Won't you tell me? In both pairs, the negative should 
lead to less politeness. 
 
The final factor is strength. Compare I will go and I want to go. Although they differ in other ways too, they 
differ in the strength of the implied desire to go. Will indicates an intention to go; want indicates a more positive 
desire. For A to ask B to want to tell her something is therefore to ask for a stronger commitment. Since that is 
more costly to B, Do you want to tell me? should be less polite than Will you tell me? Also, there is a difference 
in strength of imposition implied between Would you mind? and Would it be too much trouble? With the first, A 
doesn't suggest that her imposition on B is very great, whereas with the second, she does — it may be too much 
trouble. Since the second benefits B more than the first, it should be more polite. 
 
These predictions assume requests among peers who are acquainted but not intimate. Among other people, the 
same factors should come into play but with different consequences. It would be very odd for a general to ask a 
private May I ask you what time it is? That would put the general in an inferior position that is inconsistent with 
his rank. The literal meaning still benefits B. It is just that it is inappropriate for a general to defer to a private. 
This suggests that politeness, as defined by costs and benefits, can be studied somewhat independently of 
appropriateness, whether or not it is appropriate to be so polite, or impolite. In this paper we will avoid this 




Experiment 1  
Method 
Thirty Stanford University undergraduate students rated the politeness of 54 requests, three of each of the 18 
types of requests in Table 1. 
 
The 54 sentences used each requested different information. The information was ordinary, but fictitious 
everyday information of a relatively simple kind about who someone was, what something was, or where or 
when something happened. There was one each of these three kinds of content for each of the 18 types of 
requests. Examples: May I ask you where you bought your jacket? and Did you tell me who went to the party 
last night? These 54 requests were typed in random order, 18 to a page, on three mimeographed sheets, which 
were stapled in random order for each student. The students wrote their ratings next to each request. 
 
The students were instructed to rate each request on the following scale: 1 — very polite; 2 — fairly polite; 3 — 
somewhat polite; 4 — neither polite nor impolite; 5 — somewhat impolite; 6 — fairly impolite; and 7 — very 
impolite. They were either paid $2.50 or given credit for a course requirement, and were the same students who 
participated in Experiment 4. They completed Experiment 4 first and then Experiment 1, all within an hour. 
 
Results 
The ratings of politeness turned out very much as predicted. This can be seen in Table 2, which lists the mean 
rating for each type of request and for each category. These means were submitted to an analysis of variance in 
which both subjects and items were random effects (Clark, 1973). It showed that the means differed reliably 
from one another, F' (17,71) = 15.66, p < 0.001. 
 
The mean ratings for the six categories of requests were expected to order themselves from permission to 
obligation, and except for a minor reversal, they did: 2.16, 3.04, 3.85, 3.80, 4.20 and 5.77. These ratings are 
significantly correlated with the predicted rank order (Abelson & Tukey, 1963), F' (1,71) = 166.08, p < 0.001. 
The predicted rank order accounts for 57% of the variance among the 18 means. If instead of taking all the 
means we consider only the two most polite forms within each category, the ordering is still as predicted, except 
for a different minor reversal: 1.94, 3.04, 2.92, 3.50, 3.82, and 5.77. 
 
The three subsidiary predictions were also generally upheld. Conditional modal verbs raised politeness an 
average of 0.54 units, F' (1,71) = 5.87, p < 0.001. The increase was 0.17 units for may/might, 0.59 units for can/ 
could, and 0.85 units for will/would. As for negativity, an added negative lowered politeness an average of 1.26 
units, F' (1,71) = 23.32, p < 0.001. The decrease was 2.36 units for can/can't, although only 0.17 units for 
will/won't, so this finding isn't nearly as consistent. Finally, strength was important. Will you? was 0.50 units 
more polite than Do you want?, and Would it be too much trouble? 0.54 units more polite than Would you 
mind?, together F' (1,71) = 4.06,p < 0.05. If we combine the rank order of the six categories, conditionality, 
negativity, and strength, we account for 80% of the variance among the 18 means with only 4 degrees of 
freedom. The variance left over, however, is sizable and significant, F' (13,71) = 7.04, p < 0.001, suggesting 
that we haven't identified all of the factors that affect politeness. 
 
Discussion 
The costs and benefits theory of politeness is strongly supported by these results. It says that the more A's 
request benefits B, within limits, the more polite A is. On this basis we identified six broad categories of 
requests, and they were ordered in politeness as predicted. And we identified three other factors that should 
affect politeness - conditionality, negativity, and strength -- and they turned out roughly as predicted. 
 
But are these requests understood by an idiomatic process, or by a multiple-meaning process? About this 
question, the results are less clear. At first, they appear to offer incontrovertible evidence for a multiple-
meaning process. Since all 18 requests have the same indirect meaning, by an idiomatic process they should be 
identical in politeness. Since they weren't, they must have been handled by a multiple-meaning process. This 
makes good sense. To judge politeness, people had to figure out the costs and benefits of each request. These 
were present only in the literal meaning, and so people must have computed both meanings. 
 
The idiomatic processes could be saved, however, if we assumed that the 18 requests weren't really identical in 
their indirect meanings, We could assume, rather, that each request had an indirect meaning with two parts: "I 
request you to tell me where Jordan Hall is" and "I am hereby being polite to degree p". Each request in Table 1 
would have a different politeness value p conventionally associated with it. This p would be conventional in the 
sense that it would be a permanent value associated with the request's form itself and would not be computed 
from the literal meaning. Crudely put, May I ask you? would have a p of 2.00, and Do I know? a p of 4.24. 
When people judged politeness, they would merely retrieve these p's and select the corresponding scale values. 
In this view, the politeness of each request is conventional, It is retrieved, not computed, each time the request 
is understood. 
 
The mystery in this position is why there is such a tight fit between the benefits and costs implied by the literal 
meaning and the conventional politeness values, the p's. The fit could hardly have come about by accident. One 
explanation might be historical. At one time, people computed the politeness of May I ask you? from its literal 
meaning, just as the theory claims. Over the years, however, its particular value, say 2.00, became dissociated 
with the literal meaning and began to be learned as a conventional and therefore arbitrary value. This is not 
entirely implausible. Morgan (1978) has traced just such a historical process for such expressions as goodbye, 
and Clark and Clark (1979) have done so for such denominal verbs as in to boycott grapes. 
 
There are at least two problems with this historical explanation. First, the fit between literal meaning and 
politeness seems altogether too tight. In the cases Morgan, and Clark and Clark, brought up, there were certain 
quirks of meaning. As the meaning of an expression became partially or fully dissociated with its historical 
origins, it became partly or fully specialized, or it changed altogether. There is little evidence of that sort of 
specialization in the requests of Table 1. 
 
The more serious drawback is that there would have to be too many p's. For an idiomatic process to work right, 
May I ask you? would have to have a lower p than Won't you? regardless of context. Yet, as offers, May I ask 
you to take a piece of cake? appears to be less polite than Won't you take a piece of cake? If this is so, May I ask 
you? would require one p for its use as a request and another p for its use as an offer. Each of the other forms 
would have two p's too. By the multiple-meaning hypothesis, on the other hand, this inversion is quite 
predictable. Requests are for things B didn't intend to do, and offers, for things B wants to do, so it is more 
imposing on B the more obligated he is to carry out a request, but less imposing the more obligated he is to 
accept the offer. It is more parsimonious to assume that the politeness of these forms is based on the relation 
between the literal meaning and what is being requested or offered. By this argument, a multiple-meaning 
process is necessary after all. 
 
The politeness of responses 
Just as there are many ways of making requests, so there are many ways of responding to them. For A's request 
Can you tell me the time?, B could respond in any of these ways, among others: six; six o'clock; it's six; it's six 
o'clock,. yes, six; yes, it's six,. sure, it's six; and yes, I can, it's. six. How does B choose? One way is by the 
seriousness of A's literal meaning (Clark, 1979). If B understands A to have intended the literal meaning of her 
request to be taken seriously, then to be cooperative he should include a literal move such as yes or sure or yes, I 
can. If the literal meaning was intended merely pro forma, he needn't include such a move. Another way is by 
how polite he wants to be. Some of these responses seem more polite than others. These differences, we 
propose, reflect the costs and benefits theory of politeness as applied to responses. The more B's response raises 
the benefits or lowers the costs. to A, within limits, the more polite B is. The question is how A is benefitted by 
B's response. 
 
We propose an attentiveness hypothesis: The more attentive B is to all aspects of A's request, within reason, the 
more polite B is. For indirect requests for information, there are at least four ways B can benefit A. (I) 
Precision: B should provide the requested information as precisely as required. In the time example, /t 's six 
would be more polite in most con-texts than It's late afternoon. (2) Clarity: B should express the requested 
information clearly. /t 's six o'clock, for example, is clearer without being unnecessarily wordy or redundant 
than Six, where ellipsis could interfere with A's comprehension of the information. (3) Completeness.. B should 
take seriously the literal meaning, as well as the indirect meaning. Ordinarily, that means including a literal 
move, making Yes, it's six more polite than a mere it 's six. Other times, including a literal move may lead to 
less politeness, as we shall show. (4) Informality: B should put A at ease by not being too formal, or too 
informal, for the occasion. In casual conversations among acquainted peers, Sure, it's six might well be more 
polite than Yes, it's six. 
 
B should ordinarily be much less polite when he doesn't comply with A's request. To be attentive to A's request 
is, ideally, to comply with it. There are, however, several ways in which B can mitigate the negative 
consequences of not complying. (5) Apologies: B should apologize for not complying. In the time example, I'm 
sorry, I can't would be more polite than a simple I can't. (6) Explanations: B should explain why he is not 
complying. Responses that contain a good reason, like I can't, I don't have a watch, would be more polite than 
ones without, like I can't. Apologies and explanations benefit A in different ways. Apologies place B in a 
deferential position and give A the benefit of increased status. Explanations tell A that B isn't refusing to 
comply merely to snub, put down, or otherwise do in A. Explanations lower the cost to A of B's refusal. 
Experiments 2, 3, and 4 test several aspects of the attentiveness hypothesis. Experiment 2 explores the range of 




Experiment 2  
Method 
Students were asked to rank order for politeness three to five alternative responses to each of eight requests. The 
eight requests are shown in Table 3. For each we composed two sets of three to five responses. One set 
consisted of compliant responses, and the other set of refusals to comply. These sets are also listed in Table 3. 
In composing the responses we tried to find ones that sounded as natural as possible. 
 
We constructed two different questionnaires. Each one contained the eight requests typed four to a page in 
random order on two mimeographed sheets. Under each request were three to five responses also in random 
order. For one questionnaire, four of the requests were followed by compliant responses, and the other four by 
non-compliant responses. For the other questionnaire, that assignment was reversed. For each response set 
separately, the students ranked each response for politeness by writing "1" next to the most polite response, "2" 
next to the next most polite response, and so on down to, at most, "5". They were not to give ties. One 
questionnaire was completed by 15 students and the other by 16 students, all Stanford University 
undergraduates who were either paid or given course credit. The task took less than 15 minutes. 
 
Results 
The mean rank for each response is shown in Table 3. Within each set the responses are listed from most to 
least polite. The differences within each set were tested by the Friedman analysis of variance by ranks (Siegel, 
1956). Of the 16 analyses, 14 were significant at the 0.001 level and one at the 0.01 level. The only set not 
significant was the set of non-compliant responses to Would you tell me your name? We will take up the most 
robust of these findings without further statistical justification and leave the more subtle comparisons to 




The factor of completeness turned out to be highly influential. The com-pliant responses were of two types. The 
first, called answer-plus-information responses, included a literal move like Sure or Yes, I can or Certainly, and 
the second type, called information-only responses, did not. The answer-plus-information responses averaged 
1.98 ranks, and the information-only responses 3.54 ranks, suggesting that the literal move added in a full 1.56 
ranks worth of politeness. Its influence appears even more substantial if we compare wherever possible each 
answer-plus-information response with the information-only response that was identical in every respect except 
for the lack of the literal move. Then the literal move added in 1.66 ranks worth of politeness. Within each 
response set, every answer-plus-information was ranked more polite than every information-only response, 
except for one tie. 
 
Clarity was an important factor too. This can be seen first in the information-only responses. They were 
sometimes expressed as complete sentences, like It's Tom James, and sometimes in elliptical sentences, like 
Tom James. For Requests 1, 3, and 5, where these two forms could be compared, the complete responses were 
judged more polite by an average of 1.24 ranks. Clarity also showed up in the literal moves. They were 
sometimes expressed as "full" answers, like Yes, I can, and other times as "half" answers, like Yes. For 12 of the 
response sets, there were pairs of responses that differed only in whether they contained full or half answers. In 
all 12 sets, the full answer was judged more polite than the half answers. The average difference in ranks was 
0.58. 
 
Another factor, informality, showed up too. Among the compliant responses, the literal move sometimes 
contained yes and other times the less formal certainly or sure (see Clark, 1979, Experiment 2). Three pairs of 
responses differed in this respect alone, and for each the more informal response was more polite. Informality 
won out by an average of 1.02 ranks. 
 
In the refusals the additional factors of apologies and explanations were both influential. There were six pairs of 
responses that differed only in that one contained the apology I'm sorry. For all six pairs, the apologetic 
response was more polite, an average difference of 1.00 ranks. As for explanations, every response with an 
explanation was rated more polite within its set than every response without one. Note that the full literal moves 
are often explanations themselves. For Can you direct me to the Lost and Found?, the response No, I can't 
explains briefly that B doesn't have the requisite ability. This response was more polite than the simple No, 
which can readily be taken as a refusal even to consider the request. In five such comparisons, the explanatory 
responses were always more polite, and by an average of 1.03 ranks. When the two other pairs of responses 
with and without explanations are included in this comparison, explanations had an edge of 1.25 ranks. 
Discussion 
The attentive response, these data tell us, is a polite response. For Can you tell me what time it is?, B could 
reply simply Six. He will be more polite, however, if he: (1) makes his information clearer with It's six; (2) 
answers the literal question with Yes, or more clearly with Yes, I can; and (3) softens the formality of this literal 
answer with Sure. If he intends not to comply, he will be more polite if he: (4) apologizes with I'm sorry; and 
(5) gives an explanation with I don't have a watch. Each added move signals more concern with A's full request. 
Some of them are attentive to the indirect meaning, and others to the literal meaning. 
 
If to be polite B has to be attentive to A's literal meaning, then he must be computing both the literal and the 
indirect meaning. He must be using a multiple-meaning process, not an idiomatic process. Is this conclusion 
justified? Not completely. It might be argued that just as there are conventional ways of making indirect 
requests, there are conventional ways of responding to them politely. The link between the two is historically 
based but by now entirely conventional. By this argument, B could be using an idiomatic process. However, in 
Experiment 1, we found reasons for doubting such an idiomatic hypothesis for indirect requests, and the same 
reasons should make us suspect the idiomatic hypothesis for responses. Experiments 3 and 4 were designed to 
dissect this argument more incisively. 
 
Experiment 3 
The politeness of a response need not work the same way for every indirect request. For example, while a literal 
move may add politeness for one indirect request, it may not do so for another. In this experiment we will take 
up two factors that should affect response politeness. We will use the 18 request types in Table 1. 
 
The first factor is conventionality. Indirect requests, according to Clark (1979), Morgan (1978), and Searle 
(1975), differ in how conventionally they are used for making requests. Although Can you tell me the time? and 
Is your watch still working? can both be used in the right circumstances for requesting the time, the ordinary, 
usual, or conventional form for that purpose is Can you? and not Is your watch? These two indirect requests 
differ in conventionality, and so do the 18 requests in Table 1. 
 
The politeness of a response should depend on conventionality. According to Clark (1979), the conventionality 
of an indirect request is one piece of information B uses in deciding whether or not to take that utterance as a 
request. Because Can you? is highly conventional as a request, B can be fairly confident that it is indeed being 
used to request the time and not merely to ask a question, and hence that he is expected to comply. By the 
attentiveness hypothesis, it would be impolite of him not to comply. But because Is your watch? is not 
conventional as a request, he cannot be so confident that it is being used as a request and that he is expected to 
comply. This utterance may not be a request at all, so it wouldn't be so impolite to answer it literally and do 
nothing more. The prediction, therefore, is this: The more conventional the indirect request, the more polite B is 
to provide the requested information. This prediction is tested in Experiment 3. 
 
The second factor is the politeness of the literal move of the response. For each request in Experiment 2, a 
response with a literal move (e.g., Yes, I can) was more polite than a response without. But how much politeness 
should a literal move add? That depends, we propose, on what the literal move asserts. Compare Can you tell 
me? and May I ask you? from Table 1. In response to the first, the literal move Yes, I can is really an 
abbreviation of the assertion I can tell you where Jordan Hall is. In response to the second, the literal move Yes, 
you may is an abbreviation for You may ask me where Jordan Hall is. Of these two assertions, the first would 
ordinarily be more polite among peers. The second presumes B has the authority to permit or forbid A's asking 
where Jordan Hall is, whereas the first doesn't presume much at all. When the literal moves to the 18 requests in 
Table I are each spelled out this way, they will vary in how polite they are judged as assertions. We propose that 
the more polite the assertion, the more politeness that literal move should add to the response as a whole. This 
prediction is also tested in Experiment 3. 
 
Experiment 3 is therefore divided into three parts. In Experiment 3a, people were asked to rate the 18 requests 
in Table I for conventionality. In Experiment 3b, other people were asked to rate the assertions corresponding to 
the literal moves in responses to these same requests for politeness. And in Experiment 3c, still other people 
rated the full responses themselves for politeness. 
 
Experiment 3a 
The 18 requests in Table 1 were each typed on a separate file card with Candlestick Park in place of Jordan 
Hall. The deck of cards was shuffled and presented to each of ten Stanford University students with the 
instruction: "On each card there is a different way of asking where Candlestick Park is. Some of these requests 
represent usual, ordinary, and conventional ways of asking for information, while others represent ways that do 
not seem usual, ordinary, or conventional. We would appreciate your rank ordering these 18 requests from most 
to least conventional. Just put the cards in the order you think is most to least conventional." 
 
 
The mean ranks of the 18 requests are listed in Table 4. The student raters were highly consistent in their 
rankings. Kendall's coefficient of concordance W was 0.76, p < 0.001. There was an average rank order 
correlation of 0.73 between any two student raters. 
 
The most conventional of the requests in Table 4 are Can you?, Could you?, Would you?, and Do you know?, in 
which the category of ability dominates. These requests are of middling politeness of Experiment 1. This 
suggests that even though these mean ranks correlate 0.51 with the politeness ratings of Experiment 1, 
conventionality is distinct from politeness. Recall that in Experiment 1 our hypothesis about the order of the six 
categories correlated 0.75 with politeness. Once that factor is partialled out, the correlation between 
conventionality and politeness is 0.28, which accounts for less than 8% of the variance. In short, conventionality 
appears to have a somewhat independent status. 
 
Experiment 3b 
Corresponding to the literal moves in the responses to the 18 requests in Table 4 are the 13 assertions in Table 
5. As we stipulated in Experiment 3c, May I? and Might I? both had the literal move Yes, you may; Can you?, 
Could you? and Can't you? all had Yes, I can; and Will you?, Would you?, and Won't you? all had Yes, I wilt 
That is why there are five fewer assertions than requests. Each assertion was typed on a separate file card, and 
the deck was shuffled and presented to each of ten Stanford University students with these instructions: "On 
each card there is a different statement a person might make in the middle of an ordinary conversation. Some of 
these statements are polite things to say to someone in the middle of a conversation and others are not so polite. 
We would appreciate your rank ordering these 13 statements from most to least polite. Just put the cards in the 
order you think is most to least polite to say to someone in the middle of a conversation." 
 
The mean ranks of the 13 assertions are listed in Table 5. The raters were highly consistent in their rankings. 
Kendall's coefficient of concordance W was 0.73, p < 0.001; there was an average rank order correlation of 
0.70 between any two students. 
 
These rank orders make good sense. The more an assertion benefits and doesn't cost A, the more polite it ought 
to be. So when B says that he has the ability to provide the wanted information, or that it wouldn't be difficult 
for him to do so, that should benefit A a great deal without any cost. These indeed were the two most polite 
categories. On the other hand, telling A that he intends to give the information regardless of her wishes, or that 
he is obligated to give it to her, or that she has his permission to ask him for it, or that she has forgotten to ask 
for it — all these cost A, and the assertions should be correspondingly less polite. Indeed, they were. 
 
Experiment 3c  
Method 
Thirty students were each given 54 pairs of requests and responses and were asked to rate the politeness of each 
response on a 1 to 7 scale. 
 
The 54 requests were the same as those used in Experiment 1, with three examples for each of the 18 types of 
requests in Table 1. For each request we composed three plausible responses. One had a full literal move 
followed by the requested information; a second had only a half literal move, either yes or no, whichever was 
appropriate for compliance; and a third consisted of the requested information alone. The three responses to 
Could I ask you who ate all the eggs? were: (I) Yes, you can. It was my boyfriend. (2) Yes. It was my boyfriend. 
(3) It was my boyfriend. These will be called the full, half, and null literal responses, respectively. As mentioned 
earlier, we used the indicative can, will, and may instead of the subjunctive could, would, and might for the 
literal moves, except for Would you mind? and Would it be too much trouble?, where we retained would. 
 
The 54 responses each student rated consisted of one full, one half, and one null literal response to each of the 
18 types of request in Table 1. The assignment of the full, half, and null responses to the 54 requests was 
counterbalanced in a Latin square design over three groups of ten subjects each. The 54 requests paired with 
their responses were typed in random order 18 to a page, the request on one line and its response on the next, 
and the pages were shuffled for each student. 
 
The 30 students, Stanford University undergraduates, were told to think of each request as having been made by 
Speaker A and its response as having been made by Speaker B. They were to rate the politeness of B's response. 
They used the same rating scale as in Experiment 1 on which I was "very polite", 4 "neither polite nor 




The politeness ratings came out much as predicted. They are listed in Table 6 by request type and response type. 
There are two main findings of interest, the differences among the request types and the politeness added by the 
literal move. 
 
As predicted, the mean response politeness for the 18 request types (column 4 in Table 6) correlated very highly 
with the mean conventionality for the same 18 requests (Table 4). The correlation was 0.72, min F' (1,76) = 
19.40, p < 0.001. The variance in response politeness not accounted for by conventionality was not significant, 
min F' (16,76) = 1.13. Although the correlation between response politeness and request politeness (Table 2) 
was a moderate 0.42, when conventionality was partialled out, this correlation reduced to a negligible 0.09. 
There was virtually no correlation, 0.19, between response politeness and the politeness of the literal assertion 
(Table 5). The main predictor of response politeness was conventionality: the more conventional the request, 
the more polite it was for B to provide the wanted in formation. 
 
Overall, the half and full literal moves — for example, Yes and Yes, I can — each added politeness to the 
response with no literal move. The half literal moves added an average of 0.67 units, and the full literal moves 
another 0.29 units. Both increases were significant, min F' (1,75) = 16.91, p < 0.001, and 2.97, p < 0.05, 
respectively. These data reinforce Experiment 2 in showing that the more complete the literal move in general, 
the more polite the response. 
 
The politeness added by the full literal move, however, varied from 0.06 units for Do I know? to 1.37 units for 
On you tell me? and Could you tell me? As predicted, this variation was highly correlated with the politeness of 
the assertion made by the literal move (see Table 5). The correlation was 0.73, which is highly significant, F 
(1,17) = 19.39, p < 0.001. The conventionality of the request, however, was also moderately correlated, 0.43, 
with the increase in politeness from the literal move, F(1,17) = 3.48, n.s. With both assertion politeness and 
conventionality as predictors, the multiple correlation is 0.81. 
 
Which part of the full literal move accounts for these variations in added politeness — the affirmation or denial 
yes or no, or the elliptical assertion I can, You may, or whatever? Let us call these two parts "yes/no" and 
"assertion fragment". The increase from the yes/no alone correlated a negligible 0.22 with assertion politeness. 
But the increase from the assertion fragment correlated 0.70 with assertion politeness. This correlation is only 
slightly less than the 0.73 correlation for the increase from the full literal move. The correlations for 
conventionality follow the same pattern, being 0.12 and 0.42, respectively. It is the assertion fragment, then, 
that seems to account for how much politeness is added by the full literal moves. 
Discussion 
According to these results, the politeness of responses to indirect requests fits the attentiveness hypothesis. First, 
the more conventionally a sentence is used for making requests, the clearer it should be that A wants certain 
information, and the more polite B should be to provide it. That was confirmed. For example, giving the 
requested information was more polite for the conventional Can you tell me? than for the less conventional 
Have I already asked you? Second, the more polite it is to assert what is literally being asked, the more polite it 
should be to add the literal move. This too was confirmed. Adding a pleasant Yes, I can in response to Can you 
tell me? increased politeness more than did adding an insulting No, you don't in response to Do I know? 
 
Literal moves like Yes, I can and No, you don't, we noted, divide into two parts — the yes/no and the assertion 
fragment. It was largely the assertion fragment that governed how much politeness was added. There are two 
possible reasons for this. The most obvious is that I can and You don't are clearer than the bare yes or no about 
what B is asserting with the literal move. A less obvious reason is that yes and no alone may be ambiguous. Yes 
in response to Can you tell me? might indicate either "Yes, I can tell you", which is the assertion fragment, or 
"Yes, I'll tell you if you like", which is not. The second sense indicates a mere intention to comply, which 
shouldn't vary so much from one request to the next. 
 
These findings implicate literal meaning even more than before. If B wants to respond to A's indirect request 
politely, he must "hear" at least the literal form of her request. Without that, he has no way of figuring out which 
literal move to include. But to account for Experiment 3, he must truly understand her literal meaning. He needs 
this in order to decide whether or not it would be polite to include the literal move. In short, he is required to use 
a multiple-meaning rather than an idiomatic process. 
 
Experiment 4 
What we have shown so far is that B's response to A's indirect request will ordinarily be judged more polite 
when it contains a literal move -- a move that deals explicitly with the literal meaning of the request. How much 
politeness is added depends on what that move means as an assertion. But do people trying to make themselves 
polite think of using this device, the literal move? This was the question that led to Experiment 4, in which 
people were given a request together with a response with no literal move, like Do you know where Jordan Hall 
is? and Up the street, and were asked to revise the response — Up the street — to make it more polite. By 
examining these revisions, we could test certain hypotheses about the conventionality of the request, the 
politeness of the literal move, and the elliptical nature of the response. 
 
For certain requests, B is expected to include the literal move. According to the Clark (1979) proposal, when A 
uses a conventional form for making a request, like Can you tell me?, she is very likely signalling that she 
doesn't intend the literal meaning to be taken seriously — it is merely pro forma — and so B isn't expected to 
deal with it explicitly. But when she uses a less conventional form, like Have I already asked you?, she may 
well intend the literal meaning to be taken seriously, and if B is to be polite, he ought to deal with it explicitly. 
This theory leads to a straight-forward prediction: The less conventional the request, all other things being 
equal, the more likely B will take the literal meaning seriously and the more likely he will include the literal 
move. 
 
But as we showed in Experiment 3, it isn't always so polite to include the literal move, since this may make B 
sound presumptuous or superior. It wouldn't be particularly polite to tell A that she doesn't know where Jordan 
Hall is, which is what the literal move for Do I know? would do. Accordingly, the more polite the literal move 
is, the more likely it should be included. But these considerations come into play when B is thinking of 
including the literal move anyway. That is, the predictions based on politeness of the literal move should merely 
modify the predictions based on conventionality that we just presented. 
 
Finally, there is the ellipsis of the response. A complete sentence like It is up the street is ordinarily deemed 
more polite than an incomplete one like Up the street (see Experiment 2). If people trying to be polite know 
this, then they ought to turn incomplete sentences like Up the street into complete ones like It is up the street. 
Method 
Thirty Stanford University undergraduates were each given 54 requests paired with responses that provided 
only the information requested. Example: 
 
A. Can you tell me where your parents are sitting? 
 
B. They're in the front row. 
 
For half the students, all of B's responses were expressed in complete sentences, as in this example. For the 
other half, all of them were expressed in fully appropriate but incomplete sentences, such as In the front row. 
The students were asked simply to revise each response to make it more polite and to write their revision on the 
blank line below B's response. The 54 requests were the same as those used in Experiments 1, 3a, and 3c. They 
were typed, in the format just given, six to a page on nine mimeographed sheets in random order, and the nine 
pages were given to each student in a random order. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The most obvious outcome was that there was an almost universal tendency to fill out the information 
requested. Fully 92% of the incomplete sentences given to the one group of students were turned into complete 
sentences. And although the complete sentences given to the other group of students could have been turned 
into perfectly acceptable incomplete sentences (by revising, for example, They're in the front row to In the front 
row), only 2% of them were. Indeed, the sentences for both groups of students tended to be filled out with 
material that was redundant with the request. Pronouns tended to be turned into complete noun phrases, as when 
They're in the front row was revised to My parents are in the front row, and missing verb phrases tended to be 
filled in, as when My roommate did was revised to My roommate cut my hair. There was a strong consensus that 
to be more polite, one should be clearer and more explicit about the information provided. Otherwise, the two 
groups of students didn't differ reliably, and so for the remaining discussion they will be lumped together. 
 
Although the bare responses presented to the students did not contain literal moves, many of their revisions did. 
Each of the 1620 revisions was checked for this feature, and the percentage for each request type is shown in 
Table 7. These percentages provide rather striking confirmation of our predictions. First, there was a 0.57 
correlation between the percentages of literal moves in Table 7 and the conventionality ranks of each request 
type from Experiment 3a (Table 4). This correlation accounted for a highly significant proportion of the 
variance among the percentages in Table 7, F' (1,42) = 11.72,p < 0.005. Second, there was a —0.24 correlation 
between these percentages and the politeness ratings of the corresponding literal moves from Experiment 3b 
(Table 5). This correlation, however, is spuriously low because of the correlation between conventionality and 
politeness themselves. With conventionality partialled out, as our prediction requires, the correlation between 
the percentages in Table 7 and the politeness ratings of the literal move rises to —0.50. This too accounts for a 
significant proportion of the variance, F' (1,42) = 6.08, p < 0.05. The variance not accounted for by these two 
factors is not significant, F'(15,42) = 1.23. In short, the less conventional the request, the more literal moves 
were added, and then the more polite the literal move, the more often it was added. 
 
There was other evidence that the students were sensitive to the literal meanings of the requests, some of it so 
obvious that it hardly needs to be pointed out. In Table 7 are listed the most frequent half and full literal moves 
that turned up in the revisions. These show that the literal moves the students selected were selected because 
they were appropriate to the literal meanings of the requests. Consider the half moves first. Most of the requests 
— 13 of them — were answered with yes or sure. The five that were answered no were just the ones for which a 
negative answer was appropriate. And among these five, only Would you mind? and Would it be too much 
trouble? were provided with Not at all, which wouldn't have been appropriate as literal answers to the other 
three. Then consider the full moves. In them the use of can, may, will, do, didn't, haven't, wouldn't, and 
shouldn't were always appropriate to the literal question asked. May I ask you? was answered with you may and 
not / will, while Will you tell me? was answered with / will and not you may. Yet the auxiliary verb in the 
question — can, may, haven't, and the like — is not always appropriate for a literal move of compliance. 
Accordingly, Might I ask you? was answered with you may, not you might, and Would you tell me? with / will, 
not I would. The students didn't turn the literal questions into answers by a mechanical algorithm. They chose 
literal moves appropriate to what they intended to convey. 
 
This conclusion is even more evident in the literal moves not listed in Table 7. Consider those for the 
permission requests. Generally, it isn't terribly polite to assert "You may ask me where Jordan Hall is". To 
soften its authoritarian tone, the students used marks of reassurance — of course, certainly, and sure — fully 
64% of the time. Nor is it very polite, for the memory requests, to assert "I haven't told you where Jordan Hall 
is". To soften this move, the students often used such hedges as I may have forgotten to, I don't think I have, and 
I'm not sure. These relieve the implicit criticism that is otherwise conveyed by a bald no. For the imposition 
requests, on the other hand, it is all right to assert "It wouldn't be too much trouble to tell you where Jordan Hall 
is", but even better to be more insistent, as many students were in such moves as No trouble at all, Certainly 
not, and Of course not. The critical point is that there are several ways of hedging, softening, and strengthening 
literal moves, and they are not inter-changeable. Which way is appropriate depends on the meaning of that 
particular literal move. 
 
These findings argue even further for a multiple-meaning process, since the literal meaning of the request was 
used in so many ways. It was used initially by the students in deciding whether or not to make a literal move. 
Then it was used in selecting the right form of that move and in deciding how to strengthen or soften that move 
appropriately. It seems difficult to account for this constellation of decisions with a process that used the 
indirect meaning and nothing more. 
 
General Discussion 
It is time now to draw out the three main threads that have been running through these experiments: the 
politeness of requests, the politeness of responses to requests, and understanding indirect requests. 
 
The politeness of indirect requests 
The politeness of an indirect request, we have argued, springs principally from its literal meaning. The theory 
we have drawn on, Brown and Levinson's face-work theory of politeness, predicts that a request is polite to the 
extent that it increases the benefits, or lowers the costs, to B. The request itself costs B something, since he is 
being asked to do something for A. A can compensate by various symbolic means. She can subordinate herself 
to B by asking permission to make her request, as in May I ask you? She can offer B the authority to say that the 
request is too imposing, as in Would you mind? She can give B the chance to say that he is unable to carry out 





This neat picture is complicated by conventionality. If literal meaning were the sole determinant of politeness, 
then Can you tell me? and Are you able to tell me?, whose literal meanings are roughly synonymous, ought to 
be equally polite. But they aren't. While both of them ask B whether or not he has the ability to give the wanted 
information, Are you able to tell me? signals that A more likely intends the question to be taken seriously and 
expects B to respond with a literal move (Clark, 1979, Experiment 3). A's literal meaning is a deliberate request 
for another piece of information, which should cost B something. So Are you able to tell me? should be slightly 
less polite than Can you tell me? Similar logic applies to the other categories of request types too. 
 
In an informal experiment similar to Experiment 1, we asked ten students to rank order for politeness the 
following indirect requests (each of which was completed with where Candlestick Park is): 
 
1. May I ask you'? (2.2) 
 
2. Will you permit me to ask you? (3.4) 
 
3. Would you mind telling me? (2.3) 
 
4. Would you object to telling me? (4.7) 
 
5. Can you tell me? (3.5) 
 
6. Are you able to tell me? (4.9) 
 
7. Shouldn't you tell me? (7.0) 
 
8. Aren't you obligated to tell me? (8.0) 
 
The mean ranks, shown in parentheses next to each request, confirm that conventionality matters: 1 was more 
polite than 2; 3 more polite than 4; 5 more polite than 6, and 7 more polite than 8. For the last three pairs, nine 
out of ten students agreed on the ordering; for the first pair, seven out of ten did. As predicted, Can you? was 
more polite than Are you able? 
 
So in the limited domain in which we have been working, politeness is determined by at least two factors: ( l) 
the literal meaning of the indirect request , and (2) the seriousness with which that literal meaning was 
intended.' Although seriousness is determined in our last examples by how conventional the request is, it is 
more generally determined by a number of factors of which conventionality is only one (Clark, 1979). 
 
The politeness of responses 
The politeness of a response to a request, we have argued, is governed by the attentiveness hypothesis, which is 
itself derived from Brown and Levinson's face-work theory. It is this: The more attentive B is to all aspects of 
A's request, within reason, the more polite he is. The two main aspects he should be attentive to are the indirect 
meaning and the literal meaning. 
 
The indirect meanings we have examined have all been requests for information, like "I request you to tell me 
where Jordan Hall is". To be particularly polite B should do these things. (1) Precision. He should give as 
precise information as A requires, as in Up the street instead of Nearby. This is a factor we didn't study. (2) 
Clarity. B should express this information fully enough to be comprehended with certainty. Complete sentences 
like It's up the street are generally more polite than incomplete ones like Up the street (Experiments 2 and 4). 
On the same grounds, fully spelled out expressions, as in Jordan Hall is up the street, are generally more polite 
than their abbreviated forms, at least within reason (Experiment 4). (3) Seriousness. B should be more certain to 
supply the wanted information the clearer it is that A is making a request — that is, the more conventional a 
form the request takes (Experiment 3). (4) Apologies. If B won't provide the information, he should apologize, 
as with I'm sorry (Experiment 2). (5) Reasons. If B won't provide the information, he should explain 'why 
(Experiment 2). All these, and there are probably more, are ways B can show his concern with what he is 
actually being requested to do. 
 
It is the literal meaning that we have been most concerned with. When A makes her request with, say, Do you 
know where Jordan Hall is? , she literally means "I ask you whether or not you know where Jordan Hall is". To 
be particularly polite then, B should do these things. (1) Completeness. He should deal explicitly with the literal 
meaning too, as in Yes, it's up the street (Experiments 2 and 3). (2) Clarity. He should express this literal move 
clearly, to show that he is explicitly responding to the literal meaning, as in Yes, I do — it's up the street. (3) 
Seriousness. He should give the literal meaning more attention, responding to it oftener, the more clearly A 
intended it to be taken seriously, as when she uses a less conventional form of request (Experiment 4). (4) 
Implications. Nevertheless, he should make the literal move less often, or he should soften or hedge it more 
often, the more it would cost A if he made it (Experiments 3 and 4). In response to Do I know where Jordan 
Hall is? , he will be more polite if he omits the literal move, as in It's up the street, or if he hedges it, as in Oh! I 
forgot to tell you — it's up the street. 
 
Clark (1979), in a study of indirect requests, proposed a model of how B selects his response to a particular 
request. According to that model, B's choice depends on how conventional the form of the request is, how 
transparent what is being requested is, whether special markers like please are present, how plausible the literal 
meaning is, and what A's plans and goals are thought to be. The factors we have just introduced are meant to 
complement this model. 
 
Understanding indirect requests 
What about understanding indirect requests? In the introduction we laid out two broad classes of comprehension 
processes — the idiomatic processes, which create the indirect meaning and nothing more, and the multiple-
meaning processes, which create both the literal and the indirect meaning. The indirect meaning is computed in 
both types, so the question was whether the literal meaning is computed. Mounting evidence suggests that it is, 
at least in a significant proportion of situations. 
 
The first evidence turned up in Experiment 1. There politeness varied from request to request, not arbitrarily, 
but according to the literal meaning as predicted by the face-work theory. It might be proposed, as an 
alternative, that associated with the form of each request, as part of its indirect meaning, there is a conventional 
value for politeness. This alternative isn't plausible for several reasons. First, the fit between politeness and 
literal meaning seems too exact. Second, offers that take the same form as our requests appear to convey quite 
different amounts of politeness. 
 
The rest of our evidence, in Experiments 2, 3, and 4, was that people consistently took account of literal 
meaning in judging or composing responses to indirect requests. In Experiment 2, they preferred as polite 
responses ones that included literal moves. In Experiment 3, they generally preferred literal moves that were 
explicit over ones that were incomplete - full over half literal moves. However, they modulated these judgments 
by what the literal moves - responding to the literal meaning would actually mean when asserted. In Experiment 
4, to be polite, they created literal moves, but held back on them, or hedged them, when they would exact too 
much cost from the requester. In all three experiments, people kept close track not merely of the literal form of 
the indirect request, but also of its literal meaning. 
 
Not all of this evidence, however, seems to require a multiple-meaning process on each and every occasion. In 
Experiment 4, it could be argued that the revisions without literal moves - 45% of the total — were at least 
sometimes composed by people who had not computed the literal meaning. On these occasions, the requests 
were understood in the same idiomatic way we suggested How do you do? is ordinarily understood. 
The critical question for indirect requests, then, is under what conditions could an idiomatic process be used. 
Such a process requires two things. First, it requires the form of the indirect request to be conventional enough 
to be recognized as a request. This requirement is satisfied by many indirect requests (see Clark, 1979). Indeed, 
the same requirement is needed in a multiple-meaning process to account for how seriously the literal meaning 
is to be taken. Second, it requires that, on the occasion on which the request is uttered, politeness and other 
things associated with the literal meaning do not matter to the listener. For indirect requests, it isn't obvious 
whether this second requirement is ever satisfied. 
 
Politeness almost always matters — if only by default. In our experiments, it mattered a great deal since that 
was what the students were asked to judge. But in ordinary circumstances, it matters too. People appear to have 
strong expectations in each kind of circumstance about the forms of request A would ordinarily use. When 
asked for the time, for example, B might expect the highly conventional Can you tell me the time? , which asks 
about his abilities. When A uses a form he does not expect, regardless of how conventional it is, he takes her as 
signalling, by her contrast in form, a contrast in meaning. If she had used Would you tell me the time? , querying 
his conditional intentions instead, he should see that she had perhaps expected him to tell her the time and was 
wondering why he hadn't. Unlike the contrast in meaning between the idioms Hi and How do you do? , the 
contrast here is signalled by the difference in literal meaning. Our conjecture is this: Any contrast with the 
default, or expected, form of request indicates a contrast in meaning; if B is ever to recognize that contrast, it 
must be on the basis of the literal meaning via a multiple-meaning process. 
 
Even aside from politeness, highly conventional forms of indirect requests are not interchangeable from one 
situation to the next. In asking B for his middle name, for example, A could use the highly conventional Could 
you tell me your middle name? but not the equally conventional Do you know your middle name? The second 
request is odd because of its literal meaning, which supposes that B might not know his middle name. There are 
probably subtle contrasts like this between virtually any two indirect requests that can be made in a particular 
circumstance. To show that B uses an idiomatic process in any of these circumstances, we would have to show 
that he is indifferent to subtle distinctions conveyed by the literal meanings — for example, that he isn't stopped 
for even the slightest moment by the oddness of Do you know your middle name? Such a hypothesis should be 
difficult to prove. 
 
Thus, the idiomatic processes, however promising they look at the outset, should not be assumed too readily. In 
one field experiment (Clark, 1979, Experiment 1), 50 merchants were telephoned and asked Could you tell me 
the time you close tonight? Only four of them, or 8%, included a literal move in their response. One might be 
tempted to conclude that the other 92% had used an idiomatic process. Yet in another field experiment (Munro, 
1977), students on the UCLA campus were approached and asked Could you tell me the time?, virtually the 
same request. Of these, 57% included a literal move, presumably because the face-to-face situation led them to 
be more polite. One might now be tempted to conclude that people use an idiomatic process except when they 
anticipate they will have to be particularly polite. But if politeness is an inherent part in every interchange of 





 In all our experiments we used Stanford University undergraduates, who are drawn from all over the United 
States. While there may be dialectal variations in the phenomena we are studying, our data should be fairly 
representative of middle class American speech. In any case, our general conclusions, especially those about 
comprehension, shouldn't be affected by any variations that do exist. 
2
The request forms we used, of course, can take on ironic, sarcastic, or even impudent meanings when uttered in 
just the right contexts. In assuming requests among acquainted peers, the students in our experiments appear 
also to have assumed ordinary contexts in which the requests have their usual meanings. It is an important 
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Resume 
Les demandes indirectes peuvent etre formulees de facon plus ou moins polie. Par exemple "Can you  
tell me where Jordan Hall is?" (Pouvez-vous me dire oil se trouve Jordan Hall?) est plus poli que  
"Shouldn't you tell me where Jordan Hall is?" (Ne devriez-vous pas me dire oil se trouve Jordan Hall?). 
Une approche theorique propose que plus le sens litteral de la demande implique d'avantages personnels pour 
l'auditeur, dans les limites du raisonnable, plus polie est la demande. Cette prediction est confirmee par 
l'Experience 1. 
 
Les reponses aux demandes indirectes varient aussi en politesse. Pour "Can you tell me where Jordan Hall is?" 
(Pouvez-vous me dire ou se trouve Jordan Hall?) la reponse "Yes, I can — it's up the street" (Oui, je peux vous 
le dire, il se trouve en haut de la rue) est plus polie que "It's up the street" (C'est en haut de la rue). Une 
extension de la theorie permet de predire que plus celui qui repond fait attention a tous les sens impliques par la 
requete, plus la reponse est polie. Les Experiences 2, 3 et 4 confirment cette prediction. 
 
Avec ces preuves, nous proposons que les gens calculent les sens directs et indirects des demandes indirectes. 
Cela est necessaire pour reconnaitre quand le locuteur est poll ou ne l'est pas, et pour pouvoir repondre 
poliment, impoliment ou de facon neutre. 
